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CLD-172        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-4056 
___________ 
 
JOSEPH OSMOND DANIHEL, 
                        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; UNITED 
STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT; OFFICE OF 
UNITED STATES SENATOR OF PENNSYLVANIA; OFFICE OF UNITED STATES 
FIRST CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA; 
OFFICE OF UNITED STATES SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA; OFFICE OF UNITED STATES THIRTEENTH 
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA; THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF THE 
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA; OFFICE OF STATE SENATOR OF PENNSYLVANIA 
SECOND SENATORIAL DISTRICT; OFFICE OF THE MAYOR OF THE CITY OF 
PHILADELPHIA; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; OFFICE OF THE CITY COUNCIL 
PRESIDENT OF THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; OFFICE OF THE 6TH CITY 
COUNSEL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; OFFICE OF 7TH CITY 
COUNCIL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; OFFICE OF 9TH CITY 
COUNCIL DISTRICT OF CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; DEREK GREEN; 
REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; BRIAN 
ABERNATHY, Employee of Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority; MR. CUORATO, 
Employee of Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority; MR. SCAFIDI; MS. SMYLER, 
Employee of The Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority; ROB DUBOW, Employee of 
The Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority; MS. JENNIFER RODRIGUEZ, Employee 
of the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority; MR. ALLEN GREENSBERGER, 
Employee of the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-14-cv-01330) 
District Judge:  Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro 
____________________________________ 
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Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 23, 2015 
Before:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 9, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Joseph Danihel appeals the District Court’s order granting the 
defendants’ motions to dismiss his complaint.  Several defendants have filed motions to 
summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  For the reasons set forth below, we will 
grant those motions and summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment as to all 
defendants.1  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Although divided into 543 separately numbered paragraphs, Danihel’s allegations 
are reasonably simple.  He claims that in February 1991, he bought a home in the “Logan 
Triangle” neighborhood of Philadelphia, an area where homes were sinking into the 
ground.  In October 1993, Danihel allegedly reached an agreement with the Logan 
Assistance Office to permanently vacate his home in exchange for $80,000.  As agreed, 
Danihel left his home, but he apparently retained ownership of the land.  Later, the City 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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of Philadelphia demolished the home because of its unsafe condition.  Both before and 
after the demolition, the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority (RDA) sought to 
purchase the land from Danihel, but the parties were unable to reach an agreement.  
Eventually, the RDA filed a declaration of taking and seized the land.  Danihel contends 
that he has not received any compensation from the RDA.  It is not clear from his 
complaint whether he received the $80,000 that he was allegedly promised by the Logan 
Assistance Office.   
 In March 2014, Danihel filed a complaint against a host of federal and state 
entities and officials.  He alleged that the defendants (1) took his property without paying 
just compensation as required by the Fifth Amendment; (2) violated his rights under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) violated his due process 
rights by taking his property without providing him with a jury trial; (4) violated his 
rights under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act; (5) violated his right to pursue happiness; 
and (6) committed legal and professional malpractice.  He sought $4 million in damages 
for each claim.  The defendants filed motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) & 
(b)(6), and the District Court granted those motions, dismissing Danihel’s complaint in its 
entirety.  Danihel then filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.  
                                                                                                                                                  
1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise a plenary standard of 
review.  See Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013).   
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 We agree with the District Court’s disposition of this case.2  Central to Danihel’s 
complaint is his allegation that the defendants have taken his property without paying 
proper compensation under the Fifth Amendment.  However, “[a] plaintiff must first seek 
compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing so before asserting 
a federal takings claim.”  Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 222 (3d Cir. 2008).  Danihel 
has admittedly not pursued an inverse-condemnation action through Pennsylvania’s 
Eminent Domain Code; as a consequence, this claim is not yet ripe for our review.  See 
id. at 222-23. 
 We likewise conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Danihel’s equal-
protection claim.  Because Danihel has not claimed to be a member of a protected class, 
his claim must be premised on a “class-of-one” theory.  See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of 
Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008).  To make out such a claim, Danihel must “allege[] that 
[]he has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there 
is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”  Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 
U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam).  While Danihel states, without elaboration, that other 
                                              
2 We note at the outset that several of Danihel’s claims are barred by sovereign immunity.  
This includes Danihel’s constitutional claims against the Commonwealth and its governor 
in his official capacity, see, e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl.-Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 
503 (3d Cir. 2001); Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1990); his state-law claims 
against those same parties, see 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2310; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 8521–8522; 
and his constitutional claims against the United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development and the president and members of Congress in their official capacities, see 
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 130, n.4 
(3d Cir. 1986).  The District Court therefore lacked jurisdiction over these claims.  See 
FDIC, 510 U.S. at 475. 
5 
 
individuals were treated better than him, these conclusory allegations are altogether 
insufficient to state a claim.  See Cnty. Concrete Corp. v. Town of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 
159, 171 (3d Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of claim resting on similar allegations).  
 Next, as the District Court explained, “it has long been settled that there is no 
constitutional right to a jury in eminent domain proceedings.”  United States v. Reynolds, 
397 U.S. 14, 18 (1970).  Thus, Danihel’s claim that his constitutional right to a jury trial 
was infringed lacks merit.  Moreover, we note that, under Pennsylvania law, Danihel was 
entitled to request a jury trial in the eminent-domain proceedings, see 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 517(b), but he has not stated whether he invoked that right.   
 We likewise agree with the District Court’s analysis of Danihel’s claim under Title 
VI.  Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, 
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Danihel has not alleged that he was harmed due to his 
membership in a Title VI class, and his claim therefore fails as a matter of law.  See 
generally Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 288 F.3d 548, 562 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 Nor did the Court err in dismissing Danihel’s claim that the defendants infringed 
his right to pursue happiness.  He has raised this claim via 42 U.S.C. § 1983;3 “[t]o state a 
                                              
3 He also relies on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), but this distinction is of no consequence.  See generally 
Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 800 (3d Cir. 2001) (“A Bivens action, which 
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claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States.”  West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).  
Danihel has not identified any constitutional provision or federal law that guarantees his 
right to happiness, and his claim therefore will not lie.  Cf. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 
57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[t]he Declaration of Independence . . . is not a 
legal prescription conferring powers on the courts”). 
 We also agree with the District Court that Danihel failed to allege that he 
possessed the requisite relationship with any of the defendants to sustain a malpractice 
claim.  See Post v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., 691 F.3d 500, 521 (3d Cir. 2012); Cost v. 
Cost, 677 A.2d 1250, 1253–54 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). 
 Moreover, the District Court did not violate Danihel’s right to a jury trial under the 
Seventh Amendment by granting the motions to dismiss.  See, e.g., Haase v. 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 748 F.3d 624, 631 n.5 (5th Cir. 2014).  Finally, given the 
serious failings in Danihel’s complaint — and the fact that the numerous documents 
Danihel has filed in this Court give no indication that he can cure its deficiencies — we 
are satisfied that amendment would have been futile.  The District Court therefore did not 
err in dismissing the complaint without providing leave to amend.  See Grayson v. 
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). 
                                                                                                                                                  
is the federal equivalent of the § 1983 cause of action against state actors, will lie where 
the defendant has violated the plaintiff's rights under color of federal law.”). 
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 Accordingly, we will grant the defendants’ motions and summarily affirm the 
District Court’s judgment.  Danihel’s petition for coram nobis, his requests that the Court 
take judicial notice of various facts, and his other pending requests are all denied.   
